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Casenotes
AND NOW THAT YOU HAVE YOUR DIVORCE,
WHERE DO YOU STAND?
Estin v. Estin'
Kreiger v. Kreiger2
These companion cases came before the United States
Supreme Court on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of
New York, and as they are both decided on the same basis,
it will be understood that a reference to the Estin case will
refer equally to both cases.
After five years of marriage, husband left wife in 1942,
and upon her action for separation a year later, husband
having entered a general appearance, the court found she
had been abandoned and granted a separation decree plus
an award of $180 per month permanent alimony. Husband
never appealed the decision, and paid the monthly alimony.
In 1944 he went to Nevada, where he sued for divorce, con-
structive service being had on the wife, who never appeared
in the action. In May, 1945, Nevada granted husband an
absolute divorce, the decree being silent as to the New York
alimony provision, though the Nevada court was apprised
of this provision. Husband then refused to pay any more
alimony, contending that the Nevada decree, being en-
titled to full faith and credit in New York, abrogated the
support decree. Wife sued in New York for arrears, and
husband appeared to contest it. The Supreme Court of
New York denied his motion to eliminate the alimony de-
cree and granted wife a judgment.' This judgment was
affirmed by both the Appellate Division 4 and the Court of
Appeals.' The United States Supreme Court affirmed.
The decision can be placed in the alternative on either
of two grounds, and a consideration of each will be under-
taken before any general discussion of the problems raised
by the case.
The Court here was face to face with the cases of Wil-
liams v. North Carolina' (Case No. 1) 6n and Williams v.
North Carolina7 (Case No. 2) 7a as regards the full faith and
' 334 U. S. 541 (1948).
-334 U. S. 555 (1948).
Estin v. Estin, 63 N. Y. S. (2d) 476 (1946).
Estin v. Estin, 271 App. Div. 829, 66 N. Y. S. (2d) 421.
296 N. Y. 308, 73 N. E. (2d) 113 (1947).
6317 U. S. 287, 143 A. L. R. 1273 (1942).
61 Italics supplied.
'325 U. S. 226, 157 A. L. R. (1945).
'a Italics supplied.
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credit to be given an ex parte divorce based on domicile.
New York had found that husband "is now and since Janu-
ary, 1944, has been a bona fide resident of the state of
Nevada."8 The husband's argument was that as New York
was obliged to recognize the Nevada divorce under full
faith and credit, it must naturally follow that no vestigial
remnants of the legal incidences of the marriage remained,
and thus the antecedent support order was nullified by the
subsequent Nevada divorce decree. The Court countered
this by stating that New York in the instant case expressly
refused to follow such rule by holding that a support order
can survive divorce, and the point for consideration is
whether or not New York has refused to give full faith and
credit to the Nevada decree. It is at this point that the
"divisible" aspect of a divorce decree becomes important.
It is admitted that there was a valid divorce in Nevada
effecting a change in the marital capacity of both parties
to the decree, but not all of the marriage obligations were
severed. There remains despite the divorce the New York
support decree. Mr. Justice Douglas, fully realizing the
criticism which might be leveled at such a stand, justifies
his position by saying:
"... An absolutist might quarrel with the result
and demand a rule that once a divorce is granted, the
whole of the marriage relation is dissolved, leaving no
roots or tendrils of any kind. But there are few areas
of the law in black and white. The greys are dominant
and even among them the shades are innumerable.
For the eternal problem of the law is one of making
accommodations between conflicting interests."'10
He then goes on to discuss the conflicting interest of
Nevada and New York in the present case. Nevada, the
state of domicile, has an interest in the case in that here
decrees must be recognized as binding so as not to prevent
the husband from freely remarrying. Its interest in the
legitimacy of children of such remarriage is obvious. Such
factors justify the state of domicile in changing the marital
status of the parties by ex parte divorce proceedings. How-
ever, New York, too, had a legitimate interest at stake,
namely that the wife should not be left penniless to become
a public charge, and New York had already taken steps
8Supra, n. 3, 482.
Petitioner argued that New York common and statutory law followed
that of Pennsylvania holding that a support order will not survive a
divorce. See Elsenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U. S. 279, 157 A. L. R. 1396
(1945).
10 Supra, n. 1, 545.
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to prevent this possibility when it had handed down its
separation order and alimony decree. By balancing the
requirement of full faith and credit on the one hand against
the legitimate interest of New York in its domiciliaries on
the other, the Court reached the conclusion that New York
had given all the faith and credit it was required to give
to the Nevada divorce when it recognized the dissolution
of the vinculum of the marriage, and felt that New York
did not have to hold its own prior support award vitiated
through the medium of the Nevada decree. New York's
legitimate interest in the status of the wife thus justified
the partial nullification of the constitutional mandate of
full faith and credit.
The Court was not unaware of the possibilities of a
valid dichotomization of the problem presented, for after
having discussed this one ground for decision, it proceeded
to lay down yet a second basis founded on the property
concept of the support decree. The New York judgment
created in the wife an intangible property interest, juris-
diction over which could arise only from personal juris-
diction over her as owner. The cases are legion holding
invalid any determination of the personal rights of the
creditor in the intangible unless the debtor appears or has
been personally served." The Court regarded the argu-
ment that the Nevada decree ends the New York support
order as an attempt by Nevada to exercise personal juris-
diction over the wife by restraining her from asserting
any claim under the New York order. To allow any court
to exercise such power without personal service is to fly
directly in the face of the long line of cases, beginning with
Pennoyer v. Neff 2 holding void any personal judgment ren-
dered without personal service or appearance of defendant.
Nevada then, not having secured personal service over the
wife, is unable to avoid her intangible property rights in
the New York judgment by any decree it might pass, and
yet the divorce decree proper will be given effect insofar
as it affects the marital status of the parties. As the Court
puts it, "the result ... is to make the divorce divisible", 3
and the primary interest of both Nevada and New York
are in such manner fully protected. Each state is restricted
to those matters with which it is most urgently concerned,
and the accommodation between conflicting interests is thus
resolved.
"Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877) ; New York Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518 (1916).
Supra, n. 11.
1i Supra, 1, 545,
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Several problems suggest themselves in this case, nor
are all of them as yet resolved. In the conflict of laws
field we find raised the question of the probable decision
of a third state, not having a set policy in such matters,
when faced with a similar set of facts. Nevada has deter-
mined that its divorce decrees will override prior support
decrees in Nevada, 4 while New York has decided that a
New York support order can survive a later Nevada
divorce,15 but is silent as to the effect of a subsequent New
York divorce on the same support order. There is no con-
stitutional requirement that F-3 follow the law of F-1 to
the exclusion of F-2 or vice versa. F-3 would be free to
exercise its independent judgment in the matter. A glance
at the contacts of F-3 with the problem might be indicative
of the line of reasoning it would apply. The suit would be
by wife for judgment of accrued alimony, and a prerequi-
site to such action would be personal service or appearance
of the husband. It would seem that the result could be
predicted in such case if either husband or wife were a
domiciliary of F-3. If the wife were the one there domiciled,
F-3 would have the same legitimate interest that New York
had in preventing her becoming a public charge, and hence
the result would probably be to refuse to give full faith
and credit to the decree of divorce so far as it attempted
to abrogate the support order. Were the husband the domi-
ciliary a contrary result would seem logically to follow,
as there the interest of F-3 would be that its domiciliary
should be protected if possible from the admittedly oner-
ous burden of supporting two families when he has been
freed by F-1 of the vinculum of the first marriage. Such
protection could be afforded by adopting the Nevada view
that the divorce ended the support order. Yet such position
would be doubtless met by the argument of due process,
and with great likelihood of success. If the support order
is a property interest, the owner thereof may not be de-
prived of it by a judgment of a court without personaljurisdiction over him. To allow such deprivation is to dis-
regard the due process clause, and for F-3 so to act is simi-
larly such a disregard. The remaining situations where
neither husband or wife is domiciled in F-3 or where
both are so domiciled will be answered in a like manner
for the same factors apply equally there as where husband
alone is a domiciliary. It would seem then that the better
14 Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 68; 25 P. (2d) 378, 380 (1933).
SSupra, n. 5, Kreiger v. Kreiger, 297 N. Y. 530, 74 N. E. (2d) 468 (1947).
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reasoned approach would favor the wife's position in such
suit.
Another problem posed by the case is that of the effect
of F-2's issuing a support order after F-1 has granted the
husband an ex parte divorce. The answer here depends
on the forum's view as to alimony. It has been variously
answered in several states. Some hold that an action for
alimony will lie apart from divorce proceedings 6 reaching
their result by arguing that the wife may not be deprived
of her property (alimony) by a decree of a court not having
personal jurisdiction over her. Other states take a contrary
view and say that an ex parte divorce so completely ends
the marriage contract that no later action, dependent on
the existence of such contract, may be brought.17 Maryland
has never had to rule on this exact set of facts, but in Staub
v. Staub"5 it was faced with a situation wherein the wife
had left Maryland and gone to Arkansas, and having pre-
sumably established domicile there, secured an absolute
divorce on grounds of cruelty. Service on husband was by
publication, and he never appeared. Later wife returned
to Maryland and sued husband for alimony alleging im-
potency as grounds for such relief. Husband's demurrer
was sustained without leave to amend and this was affirmed
on appeal. Wife argued that as she could not get personal
service on husband in Arkansas, she could not litigate the
question of alimony there and that her right now to liti-
gate the matter remained unimpaired by the Arkansas
divorce. The court had its choice of grounds upon which
to rest a decision, there being open alternative bases. It
could have argued that wife, by going to Arkansas and
securing the divorce, knowing full well that the Arkansas
court could not pass an alimony decree in the absence of
personal service on husband, had in effect had the question
of alimony decided against her so that the matter would
now be res adjudicata. However, the court chose the other
available position in refusing to grant alimony to the wife,
and because of the basis on which it rested its opinion the
Staub case is apposite here. The only time the problem of
"divisible divorce" arises is when a state makes it its
policy to provide alimony for ex-wives, and if the state in
question has neither the procedural mechanism for, nor
the policy of, providing alimony for ex-wives then in that
"fDavis v. Davis, 70 Colo. 37, 197 P. 241 (1921); Searles v. Searles, 140
Minn. 382, 168 N. W. 133 (1918).
1Calhoun v. Calhoun, 70 Cal. App. (2d) 233, 160 P. (2d) 923 (1945);
Patterson v. Patterson, 187 P. (2d) 113 (Cal. App. 1947) ; McCoy v. McCoy,
191 Iowa 973, 183 N. W. 377 (1921).
Is 170 Md. 202, 183 A. 605 (1936).
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state there can exist no "divisible" aspect of divorce. The
Staub case sets out, in some detail, Maryland's position as
to alimony, noting that, "in this state alimony has not been
defined by statute; hence its definition must be sought from
the adjudicated cases and texts".9 Alimony in Maryland
has always been allowed as an incident of the marriage,
and the right to alimony is dependent on the status of the
parties.2" Having made up its mind as to the necessity of
the existing relationship of husband and wife as condition
precedent to any suit for alimony the court in summation
declares:
"... we are unable to conclude that the right to
maintain a proceeding for alimony may survive the
dissolution of the marriage relation, since alimony is
founded upon the common law obligation of a husband
to support his wife, which, in the absence of some
saving statute, must necessarily end by the passage
of a decree effectively dissolving the marriage tie..."I'
Maryland then clearly follows those other states which
hold that a divorce for one purpose is a divorce for all
purposes, thereby precluding any possibility of a "divisible
divorce" here.
Here it should be noted that it is only the policy of the
state as to whether or not alimony survives divorce which
gives rise to the type of problem presented in the Estin
case. New York's policy as laid down by her highest
court," is that a support order can and does survive divorce,
and even the dissent by Judge Frankfurter recognizes the
validity of such policy, his query being whether or not
New York had such a policy.23
To that end, having once determined the Maryland view
on alimony it would appear at first blush that there could
19 170 Md. 202, 207.
1 Accord Tabeling v. Tabeling, 157 Md. 429, 437; 146 A. 389, 392 (1929)
.. and as alimony pendente lite and counsel fees are allowable only to
a wife, because of the relationship of husband and wife, one who is not
a wife Is not entitled to such allowances."
170 Md. 202, 212.
Supra, n. 5.
2Supra, n. 1, 552; his argument, among others, being that New York
has not made it clear whether It holds that no em parte divorce decree
will terminate a prior New York separate maintenance award, or whether
it merely decides that no en parte divorce decree of another 8tate will
terminate a prior New York separate maintenance award. He would send
the case back for clarification. "New York," he says, "may legitimately
decline to allow any en parte divorce to dissolve Its prior separate mainte-
nance decree, but it may not, consistently with Williams v. North Carolina,
317 U. S. 287, discriminate against a Nevada decree granted to one there
domiciled, and afford it less effect than It gives to a decree ofits own
with similar jurisdictional foundation. I cannot be sure which it has done."
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be no question of "divisible divorce" as long as the Staub
case remains unquestioned. Nonetheless, it should be ob-
served that in none of the cases repudiating the "divisible
divorce" doctrine was there an appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States on the ground of denial of due
process. Such a case would have to be spelled out by
arguing that upon marriage certain legal incidences arose
from the contract itself, and one of them is a property
right in the wife to support by the husband. Ergo this right,
being an intangible, cannot be dissolved by judgment of a
court without personal jurisdiction over the possessor
thereof, and any decree purporting so to dissolve this right
is of no effect. It should be interesting indeed to see how
much argument could be met by a husband sued in a state
which refused to give recognition to "divisible divorce".
Despite the as yet unsolved problems in this field we
can see that there are certain definite rules which will
serve to guide future conduct in the matter of divorce
strategy. They may be perhaps the more clearly set forth
by a rationale of the instant case itself. From it we find
that F-1 may decree an ex parte divorce which is entitled
to full faith and credit in all states, and which completely
dissolves the marriage vinculum; yet this very divorce
will not dissolve a prior support decree of F-2 if F-2 has
a policy of "divisible divorce", unless the wife is before
the court in F-1. To state the rule of the case is to state
the advice to be given those seeking divorce and freedom
from prior support decrees, the advice being to secure
personal service on the wife in F-1 where the divorce is
being sought. Without this the husband is not absolutely
sure that he will be freed of the support order.
This decision may be regarded as another point on
Holmes's shadowy but pragmatic "line which has to be
worked out between cases differing only in degree". We
are only too well aware that this field of the law is one of
the most strife-torn of all, and yet before too violently
criticizing it for an absence of a touchstone, or lack of con-
sistency, it would be well to call to mind some further
words of this same great jurist. "The truth is," he says,
"that the law is always approaching, and never reaching,
consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from
life at one end, and it always retains old ones from history
at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed
off. It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases
to grow."".
SMfissouri, Kainsas & Texas Ry. Co. ,v. May, i94 U. S. 267 (1904).
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